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Abstract
In accordance with the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (Wada) Anti-doping Code, athletes are regularly 
tested for forbidden doping substances in connection with sport competitions. Their samples are stored 
for long time, in case new doping detection techniques are developed in the future that might allow 
finding forbidden substances not detectable at present. As Wada’s ambition is not only to have clean 
competitions, but also clean athletes, different measures need to be implemented to facilitate testing in-
between competitions as well. One of them is making sportspersons fill a form to inform doping 
controllers about their whereabouts, so that they can reach the athletes and make them undergo 
unannounced tests. 
Wada’s anti-doping policy has been widely criticized for violating athletes’ right to privacy. However, this 
debate is often carried out as if it was crystal clear what kind of right this supposed athletes’ right to 
privacy is.  In this article, the notion of privacy is characterized as a previous step to asking in which 
regards Wada’s anti-doping policy might turn out to be problematic from the point of view of privacy 
protection.  A preliminary conclusion reached is that the right of privacy is not a single right, but rather a 
cluster of rights, each one designed to protect different areas of our lives,  and each one derived in its turn 
from other, more fundamental rights. A further conclusion to be advanced in this article is that Wada’s 
whereabouts policy cannot be condoned by any of the moral philosophical approaches traditionally 
discussed in connection with privacy.
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"De acuerdo con las normas de la Agencia Mundial Antidopaje (Siglas en Inglés: WADA), los atletas, en 
el marco de las competiciones deportivas, son regularmente evaluados para comprobar si han consumido 
sustancias dopantes prohibidas. Sus muestras se almacenan durante mucho tiempo mientras se desarrollan 
técnicas de detección de dopaje que podrían permitir la búsqueda de sustancias prohibidas no detectables 
en la actualidad. Pero como la ambición de WADA no es sólo contar con competiciones limpias, sino 
también tener a los atletas limpios, diferentes medidas deben ser implementadas para facilitar las pruebas 
también en las competiciones. Una de ellas consiste en que los deportistas llenen un formulario para 
informar a los controladores antidopaje de su paradero, para que así puedan llegar a los atletas y 
someterlos a pruebas sin previo aviso. 
La política antidopaje de la Wada  ha sido ampliamente criticada por violar el derecho a la intimidad de 
los atletas.  Aun así,  este debate es a menudo llevado a cabo como si hubiese una clara delimitación del 
referido derecho a la intimidad de los atletas. En este artículo, la idea de intimidad está caracterizada 
como paso previo a la pregunta referida a si la política antidopaje de la Wada podría resultar problemática 
desde el punto de vista de la protección de intimidad. Una conclusión preliminar  es que el derecho a la 
intimidad no es un derecho aislado, sino un grupo de derechos, cada uno dirigido a proteger diferentes 
áreas de nuestras vidas, y cada cual derivado a su vez de otros derechos más fundamentales.  Otra 
conclusión en este artículo es que la política del paradero de la Agencia Mundial Antidopaje no puede ser 
tolerada por cualquiera de los enfoques filosóficos morales tradicionales discutidos en conexión con la 
privacidad"
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1. The problem
In accordance with the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (Wada) Anti-doping Code, athletes 
are regularly tested for forbidden doping substances in connection with sport competitions. 
Their samples are stored for long time, in case new doping detection techniques are developed 
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in the future that might allow finding forbidden substances not detectable at  present. As 
Wada’s ambition is not only to have clean competitions, but also clean athletes, different 
measures need to be implemented to facilitate testing in-between competitions as well. One of 
them is making sportspersons fill a form to inform doping controllers about their 
whereabouts, so that they can reach the athletes and make them undergo unannounced tests. 
Wada’s anti-doping policy  has been – widely, I would say - criticized for violating 
athletes’ right to privacy. However, this debate is often carried out as if it was crystal clear 
what kind of right this supposed athletes’ right to privacy is. This is far from being the case. 
As Judith Jarvis Thompson stated in her seminal paper from 1975, “[p]erhaps the most 
striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any  very clear idea what 
it is”.1 Almost thirty  years later, things do not seem to have improved so much in this regard. 
So, it seems as if we need, if not a definition, at  least a characterization of what this presumed 
right to privacy might be thought to cover. Let us do this conceptual homework by asking in 
which regards Wada’s anti-doping policy  might turn out to be problematic from the point of 
view of privacy protection. 
2. What kind of right?
What kind of right is the right to privacy?
 (1) To begin with, it could be said that  athletes’ bodily integrity is violated by the very 
invasive nature of samples collection. Particularly regarding gene doping, it has been argued 
that in order to perform testing, it will be difficult to avoid taking tissue samples from 
athletes.2  But even traditional doping testing amounts to an intrusive practice in that it 
requires athletes to hand over bodily fluids to the testers.
(2) Second, depending on how athletes’ samples are stored, doping testing might  also be 
said to violate their self-ownership, in particular regarding their own bodies. This is specially 
related to the fact that, once athletes get their bodily fluids or tissue samples extracted by 
testing officials, they  no longer dispose of them and have actually no saying at all on their 
future uses. The European Commission has for instance expressed its concern with the fact 
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1 “The Right to Privacy”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Summer, 1975), pp. 295-314. Quotation 
gathered from p. 295.
2 See, for instance, Wells, D.J., Baoutina et al. and Guescini et al.
that athletes’ samples are kept too long in Wada’s repositories (for 8 years, according to 
Wada’s International Standard on the Protection of Privacy and Personal Protection).3
(3) Third, it is also objected that Wada’s anti-doping policy violates athletes’ right to an 
intimate sphere, free from the unwanted intrusion of other persons (what is usually called “the 
right to be left alone”). In relation to this latter aspect, the strongest criticism stems from the 
athletes themselves. Thus, the European Elite Athletes Association, which represents 
approximately 25 000 sport practitioners said in a communiqué that although “clean athletes 
have almost universally  declared themselves willing to submit to testing in the workplace”, 
[…] they are “extremely sensitive about the invasion of their homes by anti-doping 
officials”.4 The background of this critique is obviously  the unannounced tests performed at 
any time of the day. 
(4) Fourth, there is a considerable risk that confidentiality might be broken in the process 
of gathering, storing and analysing athletes’ samples. Presumably athletes have a right not to 
get sensitive information about, among other things, their physiological and genetic 
constitution disclosed to others without their consent. With samples being sent over for 
analysis to different laboratories, there is a latent risk that sensitive information about the 
athletes might end up in the wrong hands. (I will further develop this argument when 
discussing Wada’s justification of anti-doping procedures below).
(5) Finally, related to both how athletes’ samples are collected and transferred, Wada’s 
procedures might be offensive to test subjects. First we have the fact that samples are gathered 
by means of intrusive and invasive procedures. Just  think about a scenario in which you are 
required to give a urine sample in the presence of a doping controller, with the explicit 
demand of exposing your genitals. Then we also have the troublesome circumstances in 
which out-of-competition testing is conducted. Athletes are awaked at any time of the night, 
compelled to submit an urine or blood sample, risking to get private details about their life 
styles, company  preferences, inclinations, etc., uncovered in front of the doping controllers. 
This also might be experienced by some people as a humiliating treatment that falls short of 
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3 See Directive 95/46 EC. Proportionality (or rather the lack thereof) regarding the sanctions attached by Wada to 
violations of the “whereabouts rule” is also a central concern of the European Commission. 
4 See http://www.euathletes.org
respecting individuals’ above mentioned right to be left alone in her very private, personal 
sphere. 
Furthermore, also the disclosure of sensitive details about donors’ and their relatives’ 
propensity  to develop  certain diseases might be experienced by them as humiliating. The 
public exposure of someone’s genetic propensity to develop certain diseases could be 
experienced by the persons affected as harmful to their reputation and good name. 
When reflecting on all these matters, it  is crucial that  we do not focus our attention on 
how a sophisticated Western-liberal person would react when confronted with such exposure. 
Rather we have to be aware that doping controls are universally  performed, and that they 
reach – or, rather, affect - sport practitioners living in much less tolerant social and political 
realities than the ones we have the fortune – if that is a fortune – of living in. 
So, a preliminary conclusion that we might reach is that the right of privacy as a matter of 
fact is not a single right, but rather a cluster of rights, each one designed to protect different 
areas of our lives. These different particular rights are in their turn derived from other, more 
fundamental rights. We have seen, for instance, the right to self-ownership manifested in 
individuals’ prerogative to dispose of their own body as they please, included the right to 
dispose of their own bodily parts. Such a right might be said to be derived from a more 
fundamental property right.
Then we have also the right to self-determination, grounded on the value of autonomy and 
respecting individuals’ capacity of pursuing their own projects, goals, etc., in life. This right is 
expressed, among others, by  the demand that, as long as we do not affect others negatively, 
we should be left alone to live our lives as we please.
Finally, we could also speak about a right to security, embodied in the recognition that 
individuals have a justified demand not to be exposed to adverse effects that might follow 
from others having access to, or use of, personal and sensitive information about themselves.
Now, against the athletes’ demands quoted above, and also against each and every one of 
the restrictions and safeguards expressed by the numerous derived rights the right to privacy 
seems to be composed of, it  could be rebutted that rights can after all be waived and, most 
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important, that athletes have (more or less explicitly) consented to be tested. Former Wada 
Director Richard Pound has clearly stated this point of view:
“[Sport] is governed by rules that, however artificial or arbitrary they may 
be, are freely accepted by the participants.  Why a race is 100 or 200 or 1,500 
metres does not really matter. Nor does the weight of a shot… the number of 
members on a team or specifications regarding equipment.  Those are the agreed-
upon rules. Period. Sport involves even more freedom of choice than 
participation in society. If you do not agree with the rules in sport, you are 
entirely free to opt-out,  unlike your ability to opt-out of the legal framework of 
society. But if you do participate, you must accept the rules.”5
Pound’s argument is a strong one, as it focuses on the fact that rights seldom can be taken 
to be absolute and non-overridable. To be the bearer of a particular right can be understood as 
a demand on others that implies that they have to perform something concrete that concerns 
the right bearer, as for instance when we say that individuals in a welfare state have a right to 
public health care. Usually we refer to this kind of rights as positive rights. 
A right can also be seen, not as creating a positive obligation on others to provide us with 
certain things or services, but instead as a constraint imposed on their conduct. The bearer of 
this kind of negative right is therefore entitled not to be interfered with in her pursuit of her 
life projects, goals, etc., unless s/he consents to that or there are other-regarding reasons to 
interfere. 
The right to privacy  is more reasonably seen as a constraint on the actions of others 
intended to safeguard (at least part of) our physical and psychological integrity. It is, as such, 
a negative right, as the alternative of requesting others to take active steps to improve our 
privacy appears as too demanding.
Strength 
But which strength does this right have? To say that athletes’ right to privacy is just one 
among a number of prima-facie prerogatives recognised to individuals would be too weak an 
interpretation, even for Wada. But Pound is right in that privacy cannot be seen either as an 
absolute right, never to be trumped by  another competing claim. Think, for instance, of the 
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5 This statement was made at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS) in Seattle, Washington, on 11 February 2004. See http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?
articleld=188938, for the full transcript of Pound’s remarks.
widely  recognised right that legally competent patients possess to refuse medical treatment 
they, for some reason, don’t want to undergo. In that case, there is no competing claim that 
might in the end turn the balance in favour of submitting the patient to compulsory  treatment. 
Patients’ right to refuse treatment is therefore an absolute, non-overridable one, in a way that 
the right to privacy is not, and this includes of course athletes’ right to privacy. 
Rather, privacy should be considered as an absolute right which can sometimes be 
overridden by stronger competing claims. So, the most reasonable interpretation of the right 
to privacy in bio-ethical contexts is that of an absolute though overridable right. And this is 
also the kind of approach chosen by  Wada to sustain their testing policy. I will return to this 
later on in this article.
3. Legitimacy
Let us now turn to the legitimacy of this supposed consent of athletes to be tested at any 
time, in whatever circumstances they might find themselves to be. Is it a valid consent?
I am inclined to answer this question negatively, mainly for two reasons. The first one has 
to do with the information athletes possess when deciding to waive their right  to privacy. 
Wada’s anti-doping policy is much too directed to emphasizing the risks of using certain 
forbidden substances and training methods, and too little focused on possible ways to prevent, 
or at least reduce, potential harmful effects of this use. So, to say the least, it could be stated 
that athletes’ consent to get their privacy invaded by doping controllers rest on the (false) 
assumption, based on Wada’s biased information, that  giving up  their privacy is the only way 
to reduce doping harm. 
Having said this, we should not forget that many athletes actually  believe that the 
achievement of a “doping-free sports” outweighs the privacy invasion they have to endure in 
order for testing to be possible. The problem is that these athletes have been taught to think so 
during many years by coaches and sport governing bodies. Thus there are reasons to believe 
that even those athletes who support the privacy intrusive conditions imposed upon them by 
Wada might do so without first  engaging in critical reflection on the consequences of their 
acting outside the world of sports.
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Second, and now related to athletes’ right to security mentioned above, Wada is most 
probably  promising more than it can deliver, particularly regarding athletes’ and their 
relatives’ right not  to get sensitive information about their genetic constitution disclosed. The 
European Commission has expressed its concern about the fact  that Wada gathers all doping-
related information in its database ADAMS (Anti-Doping Administration and Management 
System) in Canada, and performs then onwards transfers of athletes’ information to 
laboratories around the world for the analysis of doping tests. These laboratories are often 
located in destination countries with much less strict data protection legislation than the one 
implemented within the EU. And even in those countries outside the EU in which we find the 
same kind of legislation, legal regulations might be deficiently implemented. Related to this, 
in a report written by the EU Data Protection Working Party, it is clearly stated that this data 
procession cannot simply  be founded on the consent of the data subject.6 I think the reasons 
for this position have been properly developed when discussing Pound’s move.  
In relation to this point, it  is important to point out that reassuring Wada’s contractual 
demands on these laboratories to respect privacy  won’t be enough. Not only that appropriate 
legal mechanisms to enforce these dispositions might be lacking in some countries; even 
accepting that the risk of confidentiality  violations might be minimized by Wada’s contractual 
impositions, the amount of harm risked by  the athletes and their genetic relatives if these 
safeguards, for some reason, don’t work suggests we are facing a highly problematic 
situation. Given how samples are transferred to different laboratories once they are gathered 
by Wada officials, there is a considerable risk that athletes’ demand on confidentiality will fail 
to be honoured.
This objection is particularly  troublesome if we reflect on the fact  that the majority  of 
doping testing will be performed in countries whose democratic traditions and legal 
guarantees are miles away  from reaching a European level. In the absence of appropriate 
legislation, the results obtained from samples analysis might be used in those countries to 
discriminate against donors/athletes by insurance companies, employers or even the 
authorities. 
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6 Article 8, paragraph 5 of Directive 95/46 EC. 
Athletes’ consent to be tested might also prove to be invalid because of the context in 
which it is required. We should recall that the kind of consent Wada demands from athletes 
has no resemblance at  all with the voluntary and freely  decided consent given by, for instance, 
bio-banking donors in general. Simply failing to correctly complete the where-about forms 
usually  results in one-year suspension from competition. In that regard, it is no overstatement 
to say that Wada directs to athletes an offer they can’t  refuse, at least if they wish to remain 
active within their professional areas. “Submit to doping procedures, otherwise…” is too 
much of a threaten to be able to speak of consent. Pound’s characterization of athletes’ 
consent as freely given is therefore, to put it mildly, inaccurate.
To neutralize all these objections, some WADA-prone authors have argued that  “sport is 
different”. Participation in high-competitive professional sports is not a right but a privilege. 
Accordingly, the imposition of otherwise unjustifiable conditions is acceptable as a 
precondition of participation in sport competitions. 
This view is not tenable. First, the “sport-is-different” argument seems to justify the 
imposition of any rules, no matter how arbitrary  or questionable. Second, there is no reason to 
suppose, much less to postulate, that athletes leave their human rights at the locker room 
when they enter the playing field.7  In the same way as athletes are not released from their 
moral and legal obligations at the very  moment they start competing (they are for instance not 
allowed to intentionally  kill a rival to win a game), they are not deprived either of their 
fundamental moral rights. Thus, sports might actually not be that different after all.  
4. The moral foundations of privacy
The obvious legal foundation of athletes’ alleged right to privacy  is that this right is part of 
current European legislation. But what are the moral philosophical fundaments athletes might 
refer to in order to support their claim to get their privacy protected?
Let us first start by  one ethical approach which is seldom discussed in this context, namely 
the so called ethics of honour. What would this line of thought say  about (i) taking biological 
samples from athletes in a coercive setting, (ii) without making the necessary arrangements to 
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7 See on this argument Schneider, A. and Rupert, J.L.“Constructing Winners: The Science and Ethics of 
Genetically Manipulating Athletes”,  Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, Vol. XXXVI, Issue 2, 2009, p. 198.
guarantee sensitive data won’t be disclosed to others, and (iii) paying unannounced visits to 
sportspersons any time of the day?  
Regarding the first aspect, I think there is little doubt that supporters of this ethical 
approach would reject being submitted to this kind of forced testing. They won’t  condone 
either a practice that might lead to disclosing confidential information about oneself to others 
without the authorization of the individuals tested. Even stronger, if possible, would the 
opposition of the ethics of honour be against a policy that implies getting one’s most intimate 
sphere invaded by controllers who would, unintentionally but nonetheless inevitably, come to 
know intimate details about the kind of life you conduct within the four walls of your home.
From the point of view of autonomy, the picture is more complicated. According to a 
positive interpretation of autonomy, being submitted to choices like “Abide to these 
procedures, otherwise…” no doubt reduces the range of actions open to athletes. In that 
regards, Wada’s anti-doping regulations might on good grounds be said to constrain athletes’ 
behaviour repertoire.
But if we instead focus on another, negative interpretation of (Kantian) autonomy, it might 
be argued that athletes, though indeed compelled to abide as a condition for being a part of 
sport competitions, can nonetheless be taken to act autonomously. The alternatives being 
clearly  and straight-forwardly stated by Wada and the sporting authorities, they cannot argue 
that they have been deceived into participating in the anti-doping programme. Without belief 
manipulation, their decision will be based on their own authentic preferences, desires, etc. In 
other words, there would be no autonomy violation to worry about in this case.
However, even in this second sense, we might still wonder whether athletes’ choices are 
not being manipulated after all.  Relevant information about the very nature of the practice of 
doping might have been withheld from athletes; they might also be the object of past and 
present indoctrination by the official sport culture. I already have touched upon this subject 
before, no need therefore to dig deeper on this argument. It  suffices here to say that  whether 
or not athletes’ choice to get along anti-doping procedures is an autonomous one is far from 
being settled by simply saying – paraphrasing Richard Pound – “well, if you don’t like it, then 
we can opt out!” 
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Also a (restricted) communitarian approach would get into problems here by  the same 
reasons. Some authors, for instance Angela Schneider, tried to substantiate anti-doping 
programmes with the argument that it embodies the general will of the community of athletes. 
Besides all the widely discussed problems attached to communitarianism (for instance, what 
could on these grounds be objected to a community whose common will is to openly 
discriminate against  ethnic or sexually  deviant minorities?), it is obvious here that the 
ideologically  biased context in which the choices of the community  of athletes are made, 
without even the possibility  of uttering a divergent opinion without  risking being suspected of 
doping, invalidates this supposedly agreed-upon will of the majority of athletes.
Finally, what would utilitarianism say about athletes’ waiving their right to privacy, or 
about a situation in which sport authorities violated it, as a means to achieve a more valuable 
goal? Well, as known, utilitarians would in principle not be opposed to that, provided the 
consequences calculus is properly done. But is it?  
Two arguments are usually advanced by sport officials to show they got the numbers (the 
consequences calculus) right.  Let us call them (a) the sport  essentialist and (b) the public 
health argument.
According to the former, sport consists of testing athletes’ natural and innate capacities, 
without the interference of artificial improvements of their sporting excellences. The goal of 
the sporting contest is therefore to celebrate the most excellent among the athletes, the winner 
in the genetic lottery that made him (it’s usually a he!) the best among his pairs. Any  deviation 
from this paradigm is seen as a depravation of the practice of sports and should therefore be 
fought back. Thus, overriding athletes’ right to privacy is a, according to this view, necessary 
means to secure the essence of sports is not betrayed. 
The answer to this argument is nowadays obvious, as it already has been widely discussed 
in the sport philosophical literature. There is no fixed essence of sports, there is no fixed 
essence of anything in general; the way  sport  competitions are conducted is constantly 
evolving and there is nothing to substantiate the claim that, without anti-doping regulations, 
some huge value would be lost that would justify violating athletes’ right to privacy.
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The second argument refers instead to the expected effects of doping practices in the 
wider population. One could perhaps accept that athletes were submitted to humiliating and 
invasive practices as part of anti-doping programmes. In that case, this would be a regrettable 
though necessary cost that has to be paid in order not to risk doping dissemination in society. 
There is however no evidence that might even suggest such a phenomenon is taking place, 
as a result of elite athletes’ doping. First, the number of professional elite athletes is too low 
to have any impact on health care budgets, even less to negatively affect how basic services in 
society are provided. There is no sign either that youngsters might be adopting the same 
doping habits of some sport stars. As a matter of fact, this is a rather common argument in the 
doping debate that must so far be considered as totally unsubstantiated. Finally we have the 
often-referred to phenomenon of gyms doping (mainly, anabolic) sub-cultures. Even if that in 
the long run might become a public health care issue, it is hard to see how clandestine use of 
anabolic steroids in private gyms (often motivated by aesthetic reasons) can be related to the 
pursuit of money, medals and prestige which characterizes a professional sport career.
If my arguments above are correct, then we might conclude that the utilitarian calculus 
won’t condone the violation of athletes’ privacy by sporting officials. Nor it would justify 
athletes in waiving this right either, with the hope of contributing to realize valuable goals, 
either in sports or in society. 
5. Conclusions
A conclusion that could be drawn from the arguments advanced in this paper is that we 
seem to need, if not  a definition, at least a characterization of what this presumed right to 
privacy might be thought to cover. Another related conclusion was that the right of privacy is 
not a single right, but rather a cluster of rights, each one designed to protect different areas of 
our lives, and each one derived in its turn from other, more fundamental rights. A further 
conclusion to be advanced as a consequence of this conceptual analysis is that violating 
athletes’ right to privacy cannot be condoned by any of the moral philosophical approaches 
traditionally  discussed in connection with privacy. Particularly the rejection of Wada’s where-
about policy by a utilitarian approach suggests this policy should be abandoned. Why keep a 
morally dubious procedure which renders no factual benefit whatsoever?
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